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The long-standing debate on the nature of consciousness and the extent to which free will
remains a valid concept has evolved a lot since the publication of Libet’s seminal work on
neural antecedents of mental states and behavior (Libet et al., 1983). It is very clear now that
it is just a matter of time for new sensors, experimental paradigms, and advanced techniques
in data analyses provide us with such a high rate of success in forecasting motor and cognitive
decisions before they appear to oneself as intentions that the whole discussion about the role
of phenomenal consciousness (P-consciousness, following Block’s terminology, 1995—or simply
P-states) in initiating decision-making and efferent commands will simply disappear (Block, 1995).
At this point, cognitive science will be finally beyond some of its oldest metaphysical debates,
while brain studies will reach unprecedented popularity across the humanities, in accordance with
the definitive assimilation of the principle that all mental states supervene from neural states,
which—should be noted—is not the same as saying that “to each mental construct there is a
neurological state,” but rather consistent with the premises that “for each mental construct there
is and there was a neurological state” and that “the information processes that culminate in P-states
are structured over time in the brain, following bio-computational rules.”
One of the main challenge of the “post-premises” phase is to define the most consistent ways
to describe the initiators of the neural signature of P-states and, when applied, related behaviors. It
is a challenge that can be broken into several dimensions, with different levels of approachability
under current methods and understandings. Whereas topics like the definition of the most relevant
sources of neural activity for different types of P-states are gettingmore andmore accessible, matters
like the neural coding of symbolic representations and the principles guiding the interactions
between these and the computation of environmental clues (sensorial inputs) in the emergence
of intentional states of affairs remain far from our understanding of the brain, as they ultimately
rely on the decoding of the “mentalese” that biologically instantiates abstract thinking and default
mode mind-wandering (Fodor, 1995).
Another point of attention is that of the evolutionary basis of consciousness. As for the initiator
challenge, this one can be broken in at least two assignments of different complexities. One
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related to the possible roles of such a definitive trait to the
human kind and another associated with the application of the
decoding of mentalese-type of biological algorithms in other
species (perhaps, proto-algorithms) so as map the evolution
of endophenotypes that culminate in human consciousness
(Cabanac et al., 2009).
It is interesting to note that at the same time that the
neural branch of cognitive science leaves less space to a
metaphysical treatment of mental affairs, its evolutionary
branch allows increasingly less room to attempts to reduce
defining characters of a species into inactive byproducts
of something else. As one would say: after the near
neutrality/molecular conceptual revolution that took place
in evolutionary biology (Kimura, 1984), we are starting
the be able to remap the scope of Neo-Darwinism (Nei,
2005) and more than ever it is clear that defining traits
tend to be functional, which herein translates directly into
increasingly less room to the assumption that consciousness
could be merely epiphenomenal. In contrast to that, it is
striking to see how often discussions on neural antecedents
(especially when related to other people’s findings) are
dragged to the hypothesis that consciousness may be a
whimsical frivolity of nature or, simply put, an “emergent
property.”
Andrea Lavazza’s approach to the role of intentional mental
states (Lavazza, 2016) can be understood as an alternative
to such deadlock, with references to free will that basically
do not change the fact that what is really at stake is the
scope of P-states. In essence, the hypothesis tries to “integrate
neuroscientific research on free will by connecting higher-level
concepts with their neural correlates through a psychological
operationalization in terms of skills and cognitive functions”;
in a sense, Lavazza is in line with authors, like Perlovsky,
who say that “believing in free will is extremely important
for individual survival” (Perlovsky, 2011, p. 4). According to
the former’s perspective, these P-states would enhance the
expected utility of behavior through the selection of the most
convenient bio-computational modes for each situation (i.e.,
overt or covert attention, deductive reasoning)—which is why
it can be classified among the hypotheses that try to shed
light into its emergency and fixation. This is obviously no
direct response to the claims that conscious has no initiating
capacity, as one could always say that these path-defying
moments where cognitive programs are selected also emerge
from neural antecedents and are no more epiphenomenal
than all others state of affairs. Actually, it is the same
argument that has been put against the idea that consciousness
could be saved as a vetoing process, until the point of no
return.
Prof. Lavazza is wise not to put his hypothesis in that
gun line, while preserving the ability to present operational
concepts, like that of a consciousness index. But that is
precisely where a totally new type of epiphenomenal conundrum
is introduced: if, for example, the role of a P-state is to
trigger a phonological loop or an audiovisual sketch pad
that will keep valuable information available for further
cognitive operations, it is indistinguishable from what has
been called central executive system, which is the instance
assumed to operationalize these dedicated working memory
modules for the past 40 plus years (Baddeley and Hitch,
1974).
Generalizing this idea, one could argue that the concept
that Prof. Lavazza found in the basis of his free will index
is the same found by Binet, grandfather of current IQ test,
who discussed competences as a matter of consciousness and
deliberative power before the enthronement of Franz Ferdinand.
In that vein, one could plausibly argue that when free will is
assumed to be an irredundant property (which is essential to
its conceptual legitimacy) that emerges through the lines of
the central executive and other computational dynamics that
have been deliberately presented without any reference to the
classic debate on consciousness, it is forcedly assumed to be
merely epiphenomenal, as it adds a variable without generating
any distinguishable output except, perhaps, P-states that merely
supervene from these cognitive computations.
There are different types of alternatives to this dilemma
(e.g., Perlovsky, 2013). One that has a proximity with Lavazza’s
approach says that a particular type of competence is instantiated
because of specific P-states (not as them), which by that means
makes them totally irreducible to any traditional dimension
of intelligence. In defense of that view, which I endorse,
consciousness can be functionally defined as an unparalleled
type of bio-computational platform that allows second level
information processing based on inferences of first order mental
states, producing sophisticated and yet innate competences like
meta-cognition and theory of mind (Metcalfe, 2008; Ando
et al., 2013). Consciousness provides us with experiential
continuity, while some of the most critical cognitive processes for
planning and decision-making (which involve mapping future
feelings over current experiences) and social coexistence (which
involves mapping other’s mental states over ours) comprise
inferences that are made with that phenomenological texture
as a base and could not be possible in a conscious free
agent.
The direct consequences of this approach to free will are
clear: volition can be considered “free” as long as it is open to
post-drive, second order processing by its instantiation in this
computational platform characterized by an experiential sense
of continuity. This may be seen as an alternative approach that
avoids the aforementioned deadlock, while being aligned with the
neural antecedent prerogative.
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